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Each part of the two-part rule formulated by the Court in
Parklane has a distinct objective. The ease of joinder limita-
tion was intended to promote judicial economy and uniformity
of judgments by encouraging potential plaintiffs to join in a
single action against a common defendant. This limitation,
however, will most likely result in the unnecessary relitigation
of issues and a greater risk of inconsistent judgments. The po-
tential unfairness limitation was meant to protect the rights of
a defendant against whom collateral estoppel is asserted. The
right to a jury trial has constitutional as well as procedural
significance and should be carefully guarded. The defendants
in Parklane were precluded from relitigating before a jury
those issues resolved in the prior SEC action merely because
of a procedural quirk which prevented the stockholders from
joining that prior action. Thus, in Parklane, the procedural
and constitutional rights of the defendants may not have been
adequately protected. Therefore, it appears that the objective
of the potential unfairness limitation was not achieved. In
summary, the impact of the majority opinion is best synthe-
sized by Justice Rehnquist: "The ultimate irony of today's de-
cision is that its potential for significantly conserving the re-
sources of either the litigants or the judiciary is doubtful at
best. [Thus, there is] .. .absolutely no reason to frustrate so
cavalierly the important federal policy favoring jury decisions
of disputed fact questions."84
DAVID D. WILMOTH
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Equal Protection - Gender-
Based Classifications in Adoptions Found Violative.
Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Caban v. Mohanmed,1 the United States Supreme
Court, in a five to four split decision, held that an unwed fa-
84. 99 S. Ct. at 664 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1. 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
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ther2 who has established a significant parental relationship
with his illegitimate child, no longer an infant, is entitled to
the same right to block adoption by withholding his consent as
had previously been given solely to the mother under section
111 of the New York Domestic Relations Law.' Unlike hold-
ings in prior illegitimacy-related cases, the Court determined
that the equal protection rights involved were violated on gen-
der-based rather than on status-based grounds. By deciding
the case on this basis, the Court nearly submerged the due
process argument proffered by the appellant and in so doing,
changed the focus to one of equal protection. Both the major-
ity and minority, however, were careful to qualify the effect of
Caban upon future adoptions by suggesting it apply only in
very similar, and therefore probably rare, situations.
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived together with-
out benefit of marriage in New York City from 1968 to 1973.
During this time, they had two children and lived together as
a family. Both Caban and Mohammed contributed to the sup-
port of the children. In 1973, Maria Mohammed left with the
children and took up residence with Kazim Mohammed,
whom she subsequently married in 1974. The children, then
aged two and four, were frequently visited by Caban, who
lived near Maria Mohammed's mother. When their grand-
mother moved back to Puerto Rico in September 1974, she
took the children with her. In November 1975, Caban went to
Puerto Rico and retrieved his children. After their return, Ma-
ria Mohammed instituted custody proceedings and was suc-
cessful. In January 1976, both Mohammeds filed a petition to
adopt the children. In March, Caban and his new wife cross-
petitioned for adoption. At a hearing before a New York Sur-
rogate Court, the Mohammeds were granted their adoption
2. For the purposes of this paper "putative father" or "unwed father" will signify
the father of an illegitimate child. This does not include a father who has subse-
quently married the mother, or who has later legally legitimized the child.
3. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 111 (McKinney 1977). The statute provides that: "con-
sent to adoption shall be required as follows: . . . (b) Of the parents or surviving
parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born in wedlock; [and] (c) Of the mother,
whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock. . ." (cited at 99 S. Ct. 1764-
65). See also H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMEsTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNrrED STATES (1968):
"The illegitimate child's adoption is authorized by most statutes upon the consent of
his mother only, reflecting the common law position that the father of the illegitimate
child has no legal claim upon him." Id. at 625.
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petition, which cut off Caban's parental rights and obliga-
tions.4 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,5
and the New York Court of Appeals6 affirmed, relying heavily
upon In re Malpica-Orsini,I a New York Court of Appeals de-
cision. This case held that a putative father is entitled to no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard at all proceedings con-
cerning his child but is not entitled to a veto power over an
adoption proceeding instigated by the child's mother who had
recently married.8 Curiousfy, the United States Supreme
Court dismissed an appeal of this case in 19771 for lack of a
federal question.10 They were, however, to decide a nearly
identical issue in Caban.
II. DUE PROCESS
The Caban majority summarily dismissed the due process
question. The appellees contended that section 111 of the New
York Domestic Relations Law treats unwed fathers no differ-
ently than it does other parents since the best interests of the
child are always the final consideration." This argument was
dismissed as specious because the questions of requisite con-
sent and the child's best interest have been recognized by the
New York Court of Appeals as distinct and separate consider-
ations. 12 In summarily dismissing the appellees' position, the
Court chose to address the equal protection argument directly
rather than as an adjunct of due process, as it had done in
Stanley v. Illinois.13 In Stanley, an absolute presumption that
4. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 117 (Mckinney 1977) (cited at 99 S. Ct. 1764 n.2).
5. In re David Andrew C., 56 App. Div. 2d 627, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1976).
6. In re David A. C., 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977).
7. 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975).
8. Id. at 569-70, 331 N.E.2d at 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
9. In re Malpica-Orsini, dismissed sub nom. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1977).
10. 99 S. Ct. at 1767 n.9. The majority indicated that "insofar as our decision is
inconsistent with our dismissal in Orsini, we overrule our prior decision."
11. Id. at 1765.
12. In re Corey L. v. Martin L., 45 N.Y.2d 383, 391, 380 N.E.2d 266, 270, 408
N.Y.S.2d 439, 442-43 (1978).
13. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
We have concluded that all fllinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a
hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody. It
follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while grant-
ing it to other Illinois, parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection
Clause.
Id. at 658. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
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an unwed father is unfit was found to violate due process. In
contrast, the Caban majority dismissed due process" by
merely acknowledging that "the appellant was given due no-
tice and was permitted to participate as a party in the adop-
tion proceedings. . .. ,,15 Further, the Court defused the ap-
pellant's substantive due process argument by noting that
[b]ecause we have ruled that the New York statute is un-
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, we simi-
larly express no view as to whether a State is constitution-
ally barred from ordering adoption in the absence of a
determination that the parent whose rights are being termi-
nated is unfit.' 6
While Justice Stewart's dissent echoes the majority's con-
clusion concerning Stanley and procedural due process, 7 he
elaborates upon the substantive due process question by stat-
ing that "the absence of a legal tie with the mother provides a
constitutionally valid ground for distinction [between fathers
of legitimate and illegitimate children]."" Justice Stewart ap-
pears to limit the father's right to a fitness hearing only if he
has established some kind of legal relationship either with the
child by legitimation, or with the mother through marriage.'9
Justice Stevens' dissent generally agrees with Stewart's posi-
tion except that Stevens views any such distinction as to the
consent requirement as grounded in the "[b]est interests of
the child."2
14. The Court dismissed the due process argument in two footnotes: 99 S. Ct. at
1764 n.3 & 1769 n.16.
15. Id. at 1764 n.3.
16. Id. at 1769 n.16.
17. Id. at 1770-71 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 1771.
19. The validity of the father's parental claims must be gauged by other mea-
sures. By tradition, the primary measure has been the legitimate familial re-
lationship he creates with the child by marriage with the mother. By definition,
the question before us can arise only when no such marriage has taken place.
Id.
20. In my view, such a decree may also be justified by a finding that the adop-
tion will serve the best interests of the child, at least in a situation such as this
in which the natural family unit has already been destroyed, the father has
previously taken no steps to legitimate the child and a further requirement such
as a showing of unfitness would entirely deprive the child - and the State - of
the benefits of adoption and legitimation.
Id. at 1780 (Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stevens in his




The Court stated it was clear that section 111 treats un-
married parents differently according to their sex. 21 The issue,
therefore, became whether this distinction bears a substantial
relation to some important state interest so as to withstand
judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause. By stating
that "a statutory 'classification "must be reasonable, not arbi-
trary," ' "22 the Court suggested that it put no credence in the
argument that unwed mothers a priori have greater concern
for their children than do unwed fathers. 23 Hence, there is no
legitimate reason to deprive unwed fathers of an equal voice in
adoption proceedings, at least in circumstances where they
lived with and contributed to the support of their children.
The dissenting opinions provide a more substantial chal-
lenge to the majority's equal protection position than did their
due process discussion. Both Justices Stewart and Stevens
agree that the state's interest in adoption is substantial
enough to obviate the need for a statute which would require
the consent of both parents of an illegitimate child.2 ' This
would, in a case like Caban, result in a standoff where the
child would not be legitimized by an adoption. However, as in
this case, where both mother and father wish to adopt the
child, and not merely block the adoption by the other, the
best interests of the child would seem to govern most sensibly.
Justice Stevens' argument, essentially founded in statistics
and probability, 25 does raise an interesting and perhaps irre-
solvable question of whether the exception should invalidate
the rule. He suggested that section 111 was valid when applied
to a newborn, 21 a contention with which the majority would
seem to agree, since it is in this instance that the majority was
21. Id. at 1768.
22. Id. (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
23. Id. at 1768.
24. "If the consent of both unwed parents were required, and one withheld that
consent, the illegitimate child would remain illegitimate." Id. at 1777 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). "If both are given a veto, as the Court requires, neither may adopt and
the children will remain illegitimate." Id. at 1779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. [In the majority's] view, since the justification is not as strong for some
indeterminately small part of the disadvantaged class as it is for the class as
a whole, . . . the rule is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause insofar as
it applied to that subclass. With this conclusion I disagree.
Id. at 1777 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 1774-75.
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willing to concede that the mother has a closer tie than does
the unwed father.2 Stevens argues that when a law is arguably
just in its most frequent application, "we should presume that
the law is entirely valid and require the challenger to demon-
strate that its unjust applications are sufficiently numerous
and serious to render it invalid." This contention seems to be
the major difference between the Stevens and Stewart opin-
ions, since Stewart takes a position which would be, by impli-
cation, closer to that of the majority. He argues that a law
which justly speaks to a majority but not a totality may still
violate equal protection.2
9
IV. THE STATUS-BASED CLASS - Levy THROUGH Stanley
What may be most significant about the Caban decision is
its assertion that any distinction to be made between the
rights of unwed fathers and mothers is essentially gender-
based." As the following lineage of illegitimacy cases will
show, this is a significant reversal of the position taken prior
to Caban, since such distinctions were fundamentally found to
be status-based.
A status-based distinction focuses upon differences in roles,
relationships, or positions, whether founded in law or mere
convention. Hence, the rights of a legitimate child are differ-
ent than those of an illegitimate one, and the rights of an un-
wed mother are different than those of an unwed father.
A gender-based distinction, on the other hand, looks be-
yond the roles of mother and father to the most basic differ-
ence between them - sex. Implicit in, yet vital to, labelling a
distinction as gender-based is the notion that any status-based
differences are either nonexistent or inconsequential and that
differences between the rights of in unwed mother versus
those given to an unwed father are not founded upon any in-
nate differences in their roles as parents.
27. Id. at 1768 n.11.
28. Id. at 1777.
29. Such laws cannot be defended, as can the bulk of the classifications that
fill the statute books, simply on the ground that the generalizations they re-
flect may be true of the majority of members of the class, for a gender-based
classification need not ring false to work a discrimination that in the individ-
ual case might be invidious.
Id. at 1771.
30. Id. at 1769.
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Two watershed cases on illegitimacy rights were decided as
companion cases by the United States Supreme Court in 1967,
Levy v. Louisiana3' and Glona v. American Guarantee & Lia-
bility Insurance Co."2 Levy was a wrongful death action
brought on behalf of five illegitimate children for the death of
their mother.3 Glona, also a wrongful death action, involved
the claim of a mother for the death of her illegitimate son.3'
At the lower court level, the Levy children were denied re-
lief on the basis of their illegitimate status, and the court ar-
gued that "[d]enying illegitimate children the right to recover
in such a case is actually based on morals and general welfare
because it discourages bringing children into the world out of
wedlock." , Similarly, Mrs. Glona lost at the trial court level
on the ground that the status distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate offspring made by statute and case law was
not unreasonable.36
On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned both decisions,
and in doing so, raised the illegitimate child out of the vague
limbo of the "nonperson. '37 In finding the Levy children enti-
tled to recovery, the Court looked to the quality of "the biolog-
ical and . . . spiritual 3 8 relationship between mother and
children, regardless of status, rather than to the purely legal
distinction between the rights of legitimates as opposed to
those of illegitimates. In Glona, the Court rejected the argu-
ment put forth by the Louisiana Court of Appeals based on a
Louisiana statute39 which precluded recovery by parents of il-
legitimate children. 0 Clearly, in restricting Louisiana's right
to draw such a legal distinction the Court understood the Con-
stitution to require something more than class distinctions
31. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
32. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
33. 391 U.S. at 69.
34. 391 U.S. at 73.
35. Levy v. State, 253 La. 73, 192 So. 2d 193 (1966). The court stated, "Our juris-
prudence is well established that 'child' means legitimate child and that recovery is
denied both to illegitimate and putative children for the wrongful death of a parent."
Id. at __, 192 So. 2d at 195.
36. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1967).
37. "We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not 'nonpersons.'"
Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. at 70.
38. Id. at 72.
39. LA. Civ. CODE ANN., art. 2315 (West Supp. 1967).
40. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. at 75.
19791
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
based upon mere status.' Much can be said of the Court's fo-
cus upon the biological relationship rather than the legal, or
status-based one; nevertheless, a biological criterion creates its
own set of problems.
The status-based shortcomings, which were directly ad-
dressed in Caban, were foreshadowed by the joint dissent to
Levy and Glona by Justice Harlan."2 He perceived the primary
weakness of the Levy majority position to be an undue restric-
tion of a state's legitimate legislative power.43 He also recog-
nized the difficulty implicit in any distinction "for neither a
biological relationship nor legal acknowledgment is indicative
of the love or economic dependence that may exist between
two persons."44 This opinion presaged the Caban majority's re-
fusal to allow a status-based distinction which, given this par-
ticular familial situation, was little more than arbitrary."
Stanley v. Illinois" involved a fact situation47 closer to
Caban than that in Levy or Glona, yet the Court's approach to
the problem posited there sheds light on the necessity for the
equal protection focus in Caban. In Stanley, appellant had
lived with a woman intermittently for 18 years, during the
course of which they had three children out of wedlock. Upon
41. "But it hardly has a causal connection with the 'sin' which is, we are told, the
historic reason for the creation of the disability. To say that the test of equal protec-
tion should be the 'legal' rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue."
Id.
42. The dissent by Justice Harlan was joined by Justices Black and Stewart.
43. There is obvious justification for this decision. If it be conceded, as I as-
sume it is, that the State has power to provide that people who choose to live
together should go through the formalities of marriage and, in default, that
people who bear children should acknowledge them, it is logical to enforce
these requirements by declaring that the general class of rights that are depen-
dent upon family relationships shall be accorded only when the formalities as
well as the biology of the relationships are present. Moreover, and for many of
the same reasons why a State is empowered to require formalities in the first
place, a State may choose to simplify a particular proceeding by reliance on
formal papers rather than a contest of proof.
391 U.S. at 80 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. "We reject, therefore, the claim that the broad, gender-based distinction of §
111 is required by any universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at
every phase of a child's development." 99 S. Ct. at 1767.
46. 405 U.S. 645.
47. Peter Stanley had three children out of wedlock with Joan Stanley, who died.
Despite the father's apparent continuing care and affection for the children, they were
automatically made wards of the state under Illinois law, which did not classify Stan-
ley as a "surviving parent." Id. at 646-49. See note 50 infra.
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her death, the children became wards of the state under Illi-
nois law. The primary factual difference between Caban and
Stanley is that the Illinois statute in Stanley allowed no hear-
ing for the unwed father nor required any demonstration of
neglect on his part before making his children wards of the
state."s Curiously, Stanley's defense rested on equal protection
rather than on due process grounds. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court raised due process and subordinated the equal
protection argument by asserting that the state has a legiti-
mate interest in protecting "the moral, emotional, mental,
and physical welfare of the minor."4 The dominant question
was not whether the state ends were valid, but rather, whether
the state had an interest in separating children from fathers
without a fitness hearing. By considering due process and the
lack of statutory authority for a hearing rather than equal pro-
tection and the presence of questionable statutory status-
based discrimination," the possibility was left open that, even
in spite of a hearing for the unwed father, the statutory dis-
tinction between mother and father of illegitimate children
made the outcome of such a hearing a foregone conclusion -
which is, in fact, precisely what happened in Caban.51 Given
the custody statute, the hearing was purely pro forma since
Caban's fitness as a parent was a foreclosed issue. So, in this
respect, Caban is the logical heir to the unresolved problem of
Stanley.
In many respects, Quilloin v. Walcott,5 frequently cited in
48. "By use of this [more simplistic dependency] proceeding, the State, on show-
ing that the father was not married to the mother, need not prove unfitness in fact,
because it is presumed at law." 405 U.S. at 650. Notice to the putative father is dis-
cussed in Note, The Strange Boundaries of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to
the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REv. 517 (1973).
49. 405 U.S. at 652.
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-1, -5 (1972).
51. Brief for Appellant at 16-17, Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979):
The hearing officer, Law Assistant Renee R. Roth, professed ignorance of
the substantive Due Process purpose of the hearing. (cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 658: "All. .. parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on
their fitness before their children are removed from their custody.") Involved
here was the threatened permanent removal of appellant's children from his
custody, or any possibility thereof. Ms. Roth iesolved her doubts by concluding
that: '"The purpose of this hearing is to afford the putative father with a
hearing."
52. 434 U.S. 246 (1977).
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Caban,53 might have precluded the necessity for the Caban de-
cision had the appellant reasonably raised the issue of gender-
based, as well as status-based discrimination.5 Although the
facts in Quilloin are readily distinguished from those in
Caban, the issues, equal protection and due process, are simi-
lar. In Quilloin, the child's father had never taken an active
role in raising or supporting the child. Upon the mother's sub-
sequent marriage and her attempt at adoption, the father
tried to block the adoption without seeking custody. Interest-
ingly, on the equal protection question, the Court pursued the
status-based distinctions between unwed and married fathers
and found them "readily distinguishable"5 and therefore not
subject to equal protection analysis. The appellant had "never
exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus [had]
never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to
the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the
child." 5 In retrospect, the perhaps rueful footnote on Quil-
loin's failure to argue gender-based discrimination may have
been an invitation to the fray.
V. STATUS-BASED V. GENDER-BASED DISTINCTIONS
For purposes of establishing parental and filial rights, a
status-based distinction that differentiates between father and
mother violates equal protection if the father, like the mother,
has established a substantial relationship with the child.
Clearly, as in Levy and Glona, in order to raise the illegiti-
mate out of the ignominy of the "nonperson," the Court had
good reason to reject a status-based distinction in order to em-
phasize that the mother of an illegitimate who cares for her
child should, for various legal purposes, be regarded no differ-
ently than a mother who bears a child in wedlock. However, as
the majority in Caban makes clear, what was appropriate in
distinguishing between the rights of parents versus the rights
of the state may not be so fitting in distinguishing between the
rights of father and mother.5 7 Unlike the sociological argu-
53. 99 S. Ct. at 1766 n.7, 1769 n.14 & 1779 n.25.
54. 434 U.S. at 253 n.13.
55. Id. at 256.
56. Id.
57. "We find that the distinction in § 111 between unmarried mothers and unmar-
ried fathers, as illustrated by this case, does not bear a substantial relation to the
[Vol. 63:131
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ments raised by the New York Court of Appeals in In re
Malpica-Orsini,51 which was relied upon in precluding Caban's
appeal in the state court,5" the approach taken by the Su-
preme Court rejects the assertion that "a fundamental differ-
ence between maternal and paternal relations"" exists at least
in respect to other than newborns." In so rejecting the appel-
lee's claim that granting unwed fathers veto rights would
hamper the state's substantial interest in promoting the adop-
tion. of children,62 the Court does not challenge the state's in-
terests in adoption but rather the reasonableness of the dis-
tinction upon which the interest is based. 3 The test applied
by the Court requires that the classification "rest on some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly cir-
cumstanced shall be treated alike."'" However, the Court is
careful to point out in Caban that withholding consent rights
from a father who "has never come forward or [who] has aban-
doned the child" 5 does not violate equal protection, and the
State's interest in providing adoptive homes for its illegitimate children." 99 S. Ct. at
1768.
58. [T]o contend that at least some of the fathers of children born out of wed-
lock should be accorded the option or veto of consent is meaningless as far as
ameliorating the [adoption] problem. To grant this right to those who acknow-
ledge paternity would require a most difficult search and constant inquiry. To
extend it to those who have contributed to the support of the child would be an
excursion into relative values difficult of proof. To allow it for fathers adjudi-
cated to be such in compulsory proceedings would not alleviate the situation
measurably since they are likely to be resentful and their legally enforced nexus'
with the child bears no relationship to their entitlement. The mere possibility
of a presently existing right on the part of even some fathers or one that might
be acquired at a later date, no matter how restrictive the group to whom the
right granted may be, is enough to discourage a wide range of prospective
placements and adoptions.
36 N.Y.2d 568, 576, 331 N.E.2d 486, 492, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, 519 (1975).
59. See In re David Andrew C., 56 App. Div. 2d 627, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1976); In
re David A.C., 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977).
60. 99 S. Ct. at 1766.
61. "Even if unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to their
newborn infants, this generalization concerning parent-child relations would become
less acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the child increased."
Id. at 1767-68.
62. Id.
63. "But the unquestioned right of the State to further these ends by legislation is
not in itself sufficient to justify the gender-based distinction of § 111." Id. at 1768.
64. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (citing test of Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)) (cited in Caban at 1768).
65. 99 S. Ct. at 1768 (footnote omitted).
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Court further suggests that perhaps such a distinction may be
made with respect to newborns."
VI. CONCLUSION
The final section of Justice Stevens' dissent s7 attempted to
indicate the narrowness of this decision's impact upon future
adoptions." With this, there is no indication that the majority
would disagree, since it is careful to exclude from its examina-
tion the issue of newborn adoption," as well as those cases
where the father "has never come forward to participate in the
rearing of the child. .,"o or where the father has abandoned
the child outright.7 1 Hence, the Court's holding would demand
only that a statute require consent for the adoption of a child
not newborn from an unwed father whose "identity is known
and. . . [where the father has] manifested a significant pater-
nal interest in the child."7
Hence, Caban v. Mohammed may be more important as
precedent for future gender-based discrimihation cases, 73 than
as a watershed case in adoption proceedings since both major-
ity and minority opinions suggest its limited application. 7 In
Parham v. Hughes, 7 decided on the same day as Caban, a
wrongful death action was brought by an unwed father for the
death of his child whom he had never legitimated. In refusing
to invalidate the Georgia statute7 which precluded the fa-
ther's action, the Court cites Caban using language which may
66. "Even if the special difficulties attendant upon locating and identifying unwed
fathers at birth would justify a legislative distinction between mothers and fathers of
newborns, these difficulties need not persist past infancy." Id.
67. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Stewart as well as by the Chief Justice
and Justice Rehnquist in this final section.
68. "In short, this is an exceptional case that should have no effect on the typical
adoption proceeding." 99 S. Ct. at 1781.
69. Id. at 1768 n.11.
70. Id. at 1768.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The precedent of Caban may be important because of the implication that a
distinction based on sex is a suspect classification.
74. Wisconsin revised its adoption statute after Stanley. See Wis. STAT. § 48.84
(1973). See also, Note, Domestic Relations - Putative Father's Right to Custody of
His Child, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 1262; Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights
After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115 (1973-74).
75. 99 S. Ct. 1742 (1979).
76. GA. CODE § 105-1307 (1968)(repealed 1979).
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prove to be the test phrase of that decision. The Court stated
that in Caban they were rejecting the notion that a "broad,
gender-based distinction. . is required by any universal dif-
ference between maternal and paternal relations at every
phase of a child's development." 77 The qualifier, "at every
phase of a child's development," may well indicate the Court's
reticence to grant many unwed fathers an equal voice in adop-
tion proceedings.
RONALD R. HOFER
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Polygraph Evidence - Im-
peachment of Polygraph Examiner Testimony by Defense
Experts Allowed at Admissibility Hearing. McLemore v.
State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 275 N.W.2d 692 (1979). In McLemore
v. State,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, where a
criminal defendant has stipulated to take a polygraph exami-
nation and the state has moved that those results and the
testimony of the examiner be admitted into evidence, the de-
fendant is entitled to present his own experts at the admissibil-
ity hearing, out of the presence of the jury, to impeach the
testimony of the polygraph examiner and the results of the
examination.
The question of whether a defendant can present his own
experts to testify against the polygraph examiner was first con-
sidered in State v. Mendoza.2 The court, reversing and remand-
ing on other grounds, there held that the "defendant's expert
witnesses may testify before the trial judge at a new admissibil-
77. 99 S. Ct. at 1754 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760, 1767 (1979))
(emphasis added).
EDITOR'S NoTE: After this article was prepared for publication the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals was faced with the issue of whether section 956.71 of the Wisconsin stat-
utes was unconstitutional because it categorizes fathers of children born out of wed-
lock and not legitimated as not being a "parent" within the meaning of this custody
statute. In upholding the statute, the Wisconsin Appeals Court echoed many of the
dissenting arguments in Caban. The court stated the interests of the state in protect-
ing minor children were substantial reasons for distinguishing the class. See State v.
Hill, 91 Wis. 2d 446, 283 N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1979).
1. 87 Wis. 2d 739, 275 N.W.2d 692 (1979).
2. 80 Wis. 2d 122, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977).
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